This paper tests the influential hypothesis, typically attributed to Friedman (1953) , that irrational traders will be driven out of financial markets by trading losses. The paper"s main finding is that overconfident currency dealers are not driven out of the market. Traders with extensive experience are neither more nor less overconfident than their inexperienced colleagues. We first provide evidence that currency dealers are indeed overconfident, which is notable since they get daily trading practice and face intense financial incentives to accuracy.
structure of the foreign exchange market and describes our data. Section IV provides evidence for the two types of overconfidence among currency dealers. Section V provides evidence for our main result, that overconfident dealers are not driven out of the market. Section VI concludes.
II. OVERCONFIDENCE AND THE SURVIVAL OF IMPERFECT RATIONALITY
The existence of overconfidence in human judgment has been studied by psychologists for decades (see, for example, Oskamp (1965) . Recent surveys can be found in Hoffrage (2004) and Alicke and Govorun (2005) . 2 The role of overconfidence has been discussed in such diverse fields as medial diagnosis (Berner and Graber (2008) ), driving skills (Svenson (1981) ) and recall predictions of children (Lipko, Dunlosky, and Merriman (2009) ). In corporate finance, Roll (1986) proposes that corporate M&A decisions are be motivated less by objectively expected gains than by managerial hubris, which leads to overpayments for companies. Overconfidence is also evidence in CEO and managerial decisions (e.g., Brown and Sarma (2007) ; John and Dimitris (2007) ; Malmendier and Tate (2005)), and it appears to be an important reason for excessive business entry in both experimental and real-life markets (e.g., Bolger, Pulford, and Colman (2008) ; Camerer and Lovallo (1999) ).
In financial markets, overconfidence has been identified in experimental markets (Biais et al. (2005) ; Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2002) ) and, through questionnaire studies, among such real-world market participants as defined contribution pension plan members (Bhandari and Deaves (2006) ), pension-plan decision makers (Gort, Mei, and Siegrist (2008) ), individual online brokerage investors (Glaser and Weber (2007) , (2009)), and financial planners (van de Venter and Michayluk (2008) ). In addition to the already-mentioned consequences of excess trading, high volatility, and momentum effects, overconfidence is a potential source of asset mis-2 While overconfidence has been called "perhaps the most robust finding in the psychology of judgment" (DeBondt and Thaler, (1995) , p. 389), there is some debate as to how to measure it (Juslin and Wennerholm (1999) ). For example, overconfidence can depend on the response format (see, for example, Cesarini, Sandewall, and Johannesson, (2006) ). It also matters how items that measure the concept are selected (Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, and Kleinboelting, (1991); Juslin, (1994) ).
valuations (e.g., Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (2001) ) and market bubbles (Scheinkman and Wei (2003) ). Models of overconfidence have shown that miscalibration can undermine financial-market efficiency (Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998); Odean (1998) ), an outcome confirmed experimentally by Biais et al. (2005) .
By now, most economists assume that departures from rationality exist in financial markets. Nonetheless, they are often that these departures compromise financial market performance.
Even if "investors are irrational …, they [may be] met in the market by rational arbitrageurs who eliminate their influences on prices" (Shleifer (2000) , p. 2). This argument is often expressed in terms of a hypothetical marginal agent: the market will achieve a rational equilibrium so long as the marginal agent is rational. 3 The present study examines whether overconfidence survives among the market participants that likely serve as marginal agents. Foreign exchange dealers set the price in almost every currency transaction of meaningful size and they speculate with substantial resources at their disposal. If overconfidence survives within this group then, given limits to arbitrage, there may not be sufficient rational marginal agents for the market to achieve and maintain efficient prices.
Skepticism about the survival of imperfect rationality is often based on three apparently logical ideas: "(i) that people, through repetition, will learn their way out of biases; (ii) that experts in a field, such as traders in an investment bank, will make fewer errors; and (iii) that with more powerful incentives, the effects [of cognitive biases] disappear" (Barberis and Thaler 2003) . From the relevant evidence, which is mixed, we first review the supportive evidence.
Consistent with point (i), research shows that, when subjects already have substantial experience with financial-market bubbles, such bubbles are less likely to emerge in experimental settings (Smith et al. 1988) . Consistent with point (ii), it has been found that certain experts -such as professional weather forecasters (Murphy and Winkler (1984) ) and bridge champions (Keren (1987)) -do not display overconfidence. Likewise, List (2003) finds that overconfidence de-3 In the foreign exchange market there is substantial positive-feedback trading, in the presence of which rational arbitrageurs may actually exacerbate departures from the efficient price (De Long et al. (1990b) ).
creases with experience to a point where it becomes insignificant among traders of sports memorabilia and collector pins. Incentives, the focus of point (iii), can also make a difference: some aspects of preferences can change dramatically between hypothetical settings and settings with strong financial incentives (Laury and Holt (2005)).
There is also a large body of evidence, however, showing that experience, expertise, and incentives are usually insufficient to eliminate overconfidence. These studies range from early psychological experiments where miscalibration did not differ according to participants" expertise (Lichtenstein et a (1977) ), to the results of experimental bidding (Allen and Dorla (2005) ), to a comparison of overconfidence in judgments made by banking and trading professionals, on the one hand, and by students, on the other (Glaser, Langer, and Weber (2005) ), to Chinese brokerage account data (Chen et al. (2007) ). McKenzie, Liersch, and Yaniv (2008) show that information technology experts and novices are almost equally overconfident, though experts as well as novices wrongly think that experts are less overconfident. Miscalibration has been shown to influence judgment even when accuracy is financially rewarded (Fischoff et al. (1977); Sieber (1974) ).
Not only is experience typically insufficient to ensure rational perception, but experience sometimes undermines rational perception. In an experiment on stock price predictions, for example, forecasting accuracy and expertise were inversely related: statisticians made more accurate forecasts than stock market experts and business students were more accurate than business teachers (Stael von Holstein (1972) ). Similarly, Glaser et al. (2005) find that investment bankers are more overconfident than laymen when analyzing financial markets. While counterintuitive, this finding can be explained by a phenomenon known as "self-serving attribution," the tendency for people to take credit for successful outcomes and to blame the environment for failures (Miller and Ross (1975) ). With self-serving attribution, overconfidence is not necessarily a static state, but instead it may increase with trading success, empirical support for which is reported in Jones and Nisbett (1972) , Zuckerman (1979) , and Statman et al. (2006) . This could imply that "…it is successful traders … who are the most overconfident. Overconfidence does not make traders wealthy, but the process of becoming wealthy can make traders overconfident" (Gervais and Odean (2001) ).
An inverse relation between accuracy and expertise could also reflect differences in the way novices and experts process information (Adelson (1984) ). Naïve decision-makers rely on fewer cues and make more conservative and constant forecasts than do experts, but the richer mental models used by experts can lead to increased scatter (i.e., variation) rather than increased accuracy (Yates et al. (1991) ). Törngren and Montgomery (2004) find that stock market experts base predictions on specific but unreliable information. Likewise, the diagnoses of expert physicians are often affected by non-predictive information (Poses, Cebul et al. (1985) ).
Rich mental representations can lead to higher overconfidence among experts (Mahajan (1992) ). Bradley (1981) examines the influence of expertise on calibration in the context of questions that are effectively impossible to answer knowledgeably (and for which correct answers
were therefore recorded no more frequently than would occur by chance). Though subjects"
claimed expertise was unrelated to correctness, their willingness to admit ignorance was inversely related to claimed expertise. Indeed, many subjects that claimed expertise failed to admit any uncertainty whatsoever even when answering incorrectly. The implications of these results for the currency market, where prices are well-approximated as a random walk and the most accurate forecast is usually the no-change forecast, are fulfilled in the evidence presented below.
Even if individuals don"t learn their way out of overconfidence, overconfident traders could still be driven out of the market by trading losses, since Odean (1998) shows theoretically that miscalibration should generate the mistake of excess trading and Odean (2000, 2001) show empirically that excess trading reduces profitability. Biais et al. (2005) find a direct empirical relation between miscalibration and reduced trading performance. Glaser and Weber (2007) find that hubris is also associated with excess trading. There is evidence of excess trading in currency markets (Bank for International Settlements (2007); Lyons (1996) ).
Despite these arguments, the finance literature suggests a number of theoretical reasons why overconfident agents might survive in financial markets. De Long et al. (1991) argue that overconfident traders outperform rational traders because overconfident traders underestimate risk and hold riskier assets with higher expected returns. 4 In currency markets it has been difficult to identify any relation between risk and return (Engel (1996) ), though recent research identifying risk with skewness is quite promising (Brunnermeier, Nagel, and Pedersen (2008) ). Kyle and Wang (1997) show that overconfident individuals involved in bilateral negotiations can survive because other participants compete less aggressively. Hirshleifer et al. (2006) show that irrational stock market investors may outperform rational investors when stock prices affect corporate investment and thus affect fundamentals, but exchange rates are unlikely to have a strong relation to corporate investment.
The survival of imperfect rationality in the foreign exchange market might more plausibly be explained by the analysis of Hirshleifer and Luo (2001) , which suggests that the trading strategies of overconfident traders allow them to better exploit the mispricing caused by liquidity and noise traders. In addition, Wang (2001) examines which confidence distortions survive when the number of imperfectly rational traders is endogenous. He finds that both underconfident and extremely overconfident agents are driven out, but modestly overconfident traders ultimately dominate in markets, like foreign exchange, with high fundamental volatility (see also Bernardo and Welch (2001); Subrahmanyam (2008) ).
Overconfidence may also enhance success through at least four psychological channels.
First, overconfidence directly enhances mental facility (Greenwald (1980) ), and might thus enable dealers to better identify profitable trading opportunities. Second, overconfidence enhances self-esteem, which in turn is associated with teamwork, organizational capabilities, leadership, and other qualities that enhance performance beyond profitability (Taylor and Brown (1988) ).
Third, overconfidence may inflate others" opinions about oneself (Trivers (1985) ): as pointed out in Benabou and Tirole (2002, p. 872) , "believing ─ rightly or wrongly ─ that one possesses certain qualities may make it easier to convince others of it."
Fourth, overconfidence fosters persistence, an essential trait for currency dealers (Felson 1984) . Trading can be extremely stressful -active dealers, whose livelihood directly depends on their profitability, make losing trades every daily. Benabou and Tirole suggest that "confidence in his abilities and efficacy can help the individual undertake more ambitious goals and persist in the face of adversity" (2002, p. 872) . Dealers concur that high confidence is critical in their profession. According to one senior trader, "When you are in the trough, you have to come out of it very quickly because if you get caught it in, it"s going to affect you." According to the trading manager a top-ten foreign exchange institution, "if you are not that self-confident, you are not going to be a good trader." This highlights the possibility that currency dealers self select for overconfidence or the "sleep-well-at-night" effect: those that can handle the stress sleep well at night while those that can"t handle the stress choose another occupation.
As this summary indicates, academic research in psychology and economics provides theoretical and empirical reasons to take seriously the hypothesis that imperfect rationality will be driven out of financial markets. It also provides reasons to take seriously the idea that imperfect rationality will survive and possibly even thrive in financial markets. Resolving this issue will require direct empirical tests, like those we provide below.
III. MARKET OVERVIEW AND DATA
Trading in the foreign exchange market, the world"s largest by any measure, averages roughly $3.2 trillion per day (Bank for International Settlements (2007) Marsh (2004)). In aggregate, the North American dealers in our study have vast trading capacity:
the sum of their daily position limits is at least $30 billion. The survey began by assessing a number of personal and professional attributes, from which we draw the following portrait of our survey participants (see Table 1 ). About half of them work in New York City, and most work in the spot market. As is true market-wide (Bank Since our study focuses on the effects of experience on overconfidence it is essential that the dealers in our sample represent a wide range of experience, and they do. (2001)). This general acceptance reflects, in part, an acknowledgment that carefully structured surveys provide no incentive to distort the truth.
It is important to keep in mind why the rationality of experts is rarely tested in finance.
Investment bankers work extremely long hours, so getting their time is a challenge in itself. The high response rate to our survey reflects close research cooperation with participating institutions and extensive follow-up efforts. Further, most finance professionals are extremely wellcompensated: established currency dealers can earn millions of dollars and base pay is in six fig- ures. In consequence, providing them with meaningful financial payoffs is almost out of the question for academic research. Fortunately, as discussed previously, existing evidence, as well as the evidence presented below, suggests that even with financial incentives for accuracy our results would be unchanged.
IV. EXISTENCE OF OVERCONFIDENCE
This section sets the stage for our main result by providing evidence that currency dealers tend towards miscalibration and hubris.
A. Miscalibration
Existing evidence that people overestimate the precision of their information largely comes from experiments in which individuals provide ninety-percent confidence intervals for general knowledge questions such as "How many miles is it from Paris to Tokyo?" (Lichtenstein et al. (1977) ). Under perfect rationality, ninety percent of these confidence intervals would contain the correct answer in the experiments, but that fraction is typically below half among experimental subjects (Nofsinger (2007) ). Our survey took a similar approach but tailored the questions to measure financial market accuracy. Each trader was asked to "enter today"s exchange rates of the Euro, the Japanese Yen, the British Pound, the Swiss Franc, and the Canadian Dollar the upper LIMIT of a range within which you expect these rates to be with a certainty of 90%."
Our main evidence in support of miscalibration comes from analyzing the confidence intervals, but we first highlight additional evidence provided by the point forecasts.
Point Forecasts
Members of the dealing community assert that traders always have "a view" concerning exchange-rate returns at our forecast horizons, and that they take these views very seriously. Accuracy matters because customers often rely on these views and good forecasting increases one"s chance of becoming a proprietary trader (considered a plum job). Nonetheless, academics have found, using empirical tests, that major dollar exchange rates are well approximated as a random walk without drift, the best forecast for which is simply the current price (Meese and Rogoff (1983) ). Forecasting exchange rates is thus, in the opinion of most academics, an exercise with little better than an even chance of success. Bradley"s (1981) analysis, described earlier, suggests that traders will generally be unwilling to adopt the simple no-change forecast despite the magni-tude of the forecasting challenge, since they consider themselves to be experts. As this implies, virtually none of the point forecasts submitted by our dealers are within a few basis points of the current exchange rate. Indeed, less than four percent are within the mean absolute daily exchange-rate change (measured over the six months prior to the survey) of that current rate.
Having a view different from the current rate might be rational for dealers with special insights about exchange rates. The dealers most likely to have special insights at our forecast horizons are the proprietary traders, who regularly keep positions open for a month or more: the horizons of other traders are shorter. If dealers have special insights, the proprietary traders" forecasts should be more accurate than current rates. We calculate each proprietary trader"s forecast error, meaning the proportionate difference between his/her forecast and the realized exchange rate on December 1 or June 1. We compare these to the proportionate forecast error from the nochange forecast. Since the surveys were completed on days and at times convenient to the traders, the "no-change forecast" is different in each case. The proprietary traders" root-meansquared (RMS) forecast errors exceed those of the no-change forecast in all but one of the ten separate forecast exercises (five currencies, two time horizons), and the differences are statistically significant in eight cases (Table 2 , Panel A). The dealers" RMS error is usually over twice the RMS error of the no-change forecasts.
Corresponding results for salespeople and interbank traders are strikingly similar (Table   2 , Panel B). Indeed, the proprietary traders" RMS forecast errors are usually statistically indistinguishable from those of other traders. Similarly, we find traders at top-tier banks are no more accurate than traders at lower-tier banks, though the former are presumably selected for excellence and paid more generously (Table 2 , Panel C). Overall, these results suggest that foreign exchange dealers overvalue their insights, consistent with results in Bradley (1981) .
Confidence Intervals
We now test miscalibration using traders' confidence intervals. The standard test involves comparing the share of confidence intervals that exclude the correct answer to ten percent, the true share under the null hypothesis of no overconfidence. The standard finding is that well over ten percent of confidence intervals exclude the correct answer, and our dealers provide no exception. For proprietary traders, 35 percent of December confidence intervals and 71 percent of June intervals exclude the realized exchange rate at the end of the forecast horizon (Table 3 , Panel A).
As before, proprietary traders are only slightly more accurate than their colleagues: across all traders, 39 percent of the December intervals and 76 percent of the June intervals exclude the realized rate. These results suggest that the dealers in our sample overestimate the precision of their information. Further support for this comes from the observation that the fractions for June are higher than those for December, since forecasting difficulty certainly rises with forecast horizons and psychologists find that overconfidence rises with task difficulty (e.g., Soll (1996) ; Pulford and Colman (1997); Dittrich et al. (2005) ; Lichtenstein et al. (1977) ).
These results, while striking, cannot persuasively demonstrate overconfidence for two reasons. First, the point forecasts are not independent: dealers frequently discuss likely future currency movements and the commentary they read frequently includes others" forecasts. In consequence, the endpoints of each confidence interval are determined in part by the nonindependent point forecasts. Second, exchange-rate volatility over our two forecast horizons could have surprised even well-calibrated observers, since rational forecasts are not necessarily accurate ones. Suppose, for example, that dealers rationally anticipated average volatility during the forecast horizon but realized volatility turned out to be higher than average. In this case their confidence intervals would have tended to exclude realized rates, as occurs in our data, despite being rationally formed.
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For these reasons we adopt an additional approach to evaluating the rationality of dealer confidence intervals. Instead of comparing confidence intervals to realized outcomes, we compare the width of the intervals to widths implied by rational volatility forecasts. These rational 6 Multiple tests are appropriate because more pronounced overconfidence has been found with subjective confidence intervals (Klayman, Soll et al. 1999 ). West and Stanovich (1997) find both substantial domain specificity in confidence judgments and general overconfidence mechanisms.
forecasts are calculated based on GARCH models of exchange-rate returns. 7 Since the dealers completed the survey sometime between July and October of 2002, the volatility forecast should vary according to the specific month in which the forecast was compiled. For each of our five exchange rates we create forecasts at horizons of 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, and 10 months, where each sample ends in the associated survey-completion month, using historical non-overlapping returns. This way each end-of-sample conditional variance estimate is our time-horizon-specific rational forecast for the conditional variance of that exchange rate over the appropriate forecast horizon. From these we calculate the associated ninety-percent confidence intervals that serve as our objective basis for comparison with the dealers" own intervals using the fact that the ninety- Though these figures seem high, it is critical to evaluate their statistical significance. We take the null hypothesis to be rationality and we view each trader"s interval as the outcome of a Bernoulli trial in which each confidence interval could be too wide or too narrow with equal probability. For each currency, month of survey completion, and forecast date (December, June) the number of confidence intervals that are too narrow should thus have a binomial distribution with p = 0.5 and n = the number of responding traders (e.g., n = 262 for December 1 forecasts for the euro submitted in July). Since our sample sizes are reasonably large and p is not extreme, the distribution is well approximated by the normal distribution with mean np and variance np (1-p) .
This bootstrap exercise shows that our results are strongly statistically significant. Marginal significance levels are below 0.0001 in almost every case. Note that this test is biased in favor of the hypothesis of rationality because our estimated "objective" confidence intervals will be a bit too narrow. This follows from our assumption that forecasts are compiled at the end of each month, which means that the true forecast horizons, and thus the true confidence intervals, will in most cases exceed the forecast horizons from which we calculate confidence intervals.
These tests assume that each survey participant decides the width of his confidence intervals independently from other participants, which seems reasonable because market participants rarely discuss confidence interval widths. Nonetheless, we next show that our conclusions hold even if the interval widths are not generated independently. To do this we bootstrap the appropriate confidence intervals under the null hypothesis that in each period t, dealer j"s confidence interval width for currency c at horizon h, CI j tch , is determined as the sum of a market-wide component, CI M tch , and an idiosyncratic component,
To determine the market-wide components we sample (with replacement) 1,000 times from our GARCH model"s fitted values of volatility to create a series of variances, , by sampling a second time (again with replacement) from the GARCH model"s fitted volatilities.
For each of the 1,000 periods, we calculate the share of simulated individual confidence intervals that are narrower than the "true" interval width, CI T tch . The distribution of these shares represents the true distribution of shares under the null hypothesis that individuals" estimated confidence interval widths are unbiased but otherwise correlated with each other. We note that this test implicitly assumes that estimated and actual confidence interval widths are uncorrelated, which we accept because it favors the hypothesis of no overconfidence and because anything else would necessarily involve arbitrary assumptions that would make it difficult to interpret the results. We carry out this test for surveys completed in July and September, since few were completed in August and October.
For the December forecasts the tests indicate that our survey participants tended to be significantly overconfident (Table 4) : we can reject the null hypothesis at the five percent level or better for eight of the ten tests (five currencies, two forecast horizons each), and we can reject it at the ten percent level in one additional test. For the June forecasts we reject the null at standard significance levels in four of the ten cases and in the other cases our failure to reject is often due to low power. For example, we cannot statistically reject the joint null for Euro confidence intervals for June forecasts submitted in September, even though 100 percent of the dealers" own intervals were narrower than the GARCH measure.
This section has provided three types of evidence indicating that currency traders tend to overestimate the precision of their information. When forecasting exchange rates they choose not to rely on the current rate, even though that rate would be more accurate than their own forecasts; their ninety-percent confidence intervals exclude the realized exchange rate in far more than ten percent of cases; and their ninety-percent confidence intervals tend to be wider than "rational" confidence intervals, meaning those based on econometric forecasts of conditional volatility. We next provide evidence that dealers also tend to overrate their personal success.
B. Hubris
Our tests for hubris are based on responses to the following question: "How successful do you see yourself as a foreign exchange trader?" The top rank of 7 was assigned to "Much more successful than other foreign exchange traders;" the bottom rank of 1 was assigned to "Much less successful than other foreign exchange traders"; "Average" was assigned to the middle rank of 4.
All categories of the seven-step rating scale were individually labeled.
We also asked the participants" immediate superiors (i.e., head traders or chief dealers) to rate their subordinates. The superiors were specifically instructed to compare individuals to others with similar responsibilities at the same institutional rank, since such specificity is shown in the organizational literature to increase discriminative ratings and to reduce judgment errors among supervisors (Locklear, Granger, and Veres (1989) ). 9 The superiors rated their subordinates along three dimensions: "overall contribution to the organization," "trading profits," and "trading potential." Traders" overall contributions to the organization were comprehensively defined to include trading profits and broader factors such as the support of other traders and the completion of tasks for the whole group (Borman and Motowidlo (1993) ). Overall Contribution thus matches the overall success rating requested of the traders themselves. Trading Profits is self-explanatory. Trading Potential was defined as the degree to which traders have the personal making of successful traders in their trading area; head traders were specifically instructed to separate trading potential from realized profits. The three ratings are highly correlated, with bilateral correlation coefficients ranging from 0.58 to 0.72.
9 For example, without position-specific standards, supervisors may show an unwanted tendency to rate workers better the higher their rank (Brandstätter 1970 ).
Our currency market professionals give themselves an average rank of 5.06, or "better than average," with standard error of 0.05 (Table 5) . This suggests overconfidence, as does the related observation that three quarters of traders perceive themselves as more successful than average, a fraction that is, of course, statistically unlikely to be accurate. Indeed, roughly fourteen times as many dealers perceive themselves above average as perceive themselves below average.
Of course, most of our dealers work at top tier institutions, where trading skill could well be above average. If this explains our result, then traders at lower tier institutions should generally rate themselves below average. However, the fraction of traders at lower tier banks rating themselves above average is only a bit lower than the fraction at top tier banks. As noted earlier, this is consistent with existing evidence. Svenson (1981) , for example, finds that 93 percent of participating U.S. college students consider themselves better-than-average as a driver. The result is notable because currency dealers potentially serve as the marginal agent in the foreign exchange market and because they have strong incentives to overcome perceptual biases.
To evaluate the statistical significance of these results we undertake a bootstrap test of the null hypothesis of no hubris, taking the superiors" ratings to represent the true distribution of ratings within rank and responsibility classes. 10 This evaluation is necessarily limited, since only two of the twelve rank-responsibility combinations include sufficient individuals to generate a meaningfully powerful test. These two categories are senior interbank traders, with 78 individuals, and senior salespeople, with 94 individuals. Fortunately, these two groups together include 70 percent of the total sample with matched ratings.
Our goal is to calculate the likelihood of observing a given fraction of self-proclaimed above-average traders within a given rank-responsibility category under the null hypothesis of no overconfidence. We create 1,000 sets of k ratings, where k is the number of individuals in that rank-responsibility category with ratings from their superior as well as themselves. Each rating is drawn at random (with replacement) from the sample of superiors" ratings. For each set of simu-lated ratings we calculate the fraction of above-average ratings. For each rating category this gives us 1,000 fractions, one from each set, the distribution of which we compare with the corresponding fraction from our k survey participants in that category. If an observed fraction is more extreme than 95 percent of the 1,000 corresponding fractions in the simulated data, we reject the null of no hubris. Note that the tests are biased towards accepting the null, since the supervisors themselves tended to rate their subordinates better-than-average. Average supervisors' ratings (standard errors) are 4.6 (0.09), 4.5 (0.09), and 4.9 (0.08) for the Overall Contribution, Trading Profits, and Trading Potential dimensions, respectively.
The tests reject the null hypothesis of no overconfidence with great statistical significance (Table 6 ). In our baseline test, which uses the Overall Contribution rating by superiors, none of the 1,000 sets of simulated ratings had a share of above-average senior interbank traders as high as the observed share of 77.7; indeed, the highest simulated share was only 66.2. Similarly, not one of the sets of simulated ratings had a share of below-average interbank traders as low as the observed fraction of 5.6; the lowest simulated share was 6.5. Our conclusions are not changed if the superiors' ratings for Trading Profitability or Trading Potential replace their ratings for Overall Contribution.
V. SURVIVAL OF OVERCONFIDENCE
Having presented evidence that foreign exchange dealers tend to be overconfident, we can now examine the paper"s central question: Is overconfidence driven out of the foreign exchange market? This could occur if individual dealers become correctly calibrated over time,
given frequent feedback and strong incentives for accuracy. It could alternatively occur if overconfident dealers are fired or choose another profession, so that only rational dealers remain in the profession. The evidence presented in this section indicates that overconfident dealers are not driven out of the market.
To examine this issue we need measures of each individual's overconfidence. Our measure of miscalibration focuses on the extent to which a dealer"s confidence intervals fall short of their value under rationality, taking the rational value to be the width calculated from our GARCH analysis. We first calculate the ratio between the width of each confidence interval and the appropriate width. As before, since the dealers submitted their surveys in either July, August, September, or October so we have four horizons each for the December and January forecast. We pause briefly to describe some properties of the two overconfidence measures. In our data, women tend to display less overconfidence by both measures; the same can be said for salespersons relative to other traders. Since women are disproportionately represented among 11 Note that the correlation between the dealers" average December and average June ratios is a strong 0.79, which suggests there is little loss of information when combining intervals.
12 This measure effectively assumes that superior"s ratings are more objectively accurate than those of their subordinates. Indeed, since the ratings of superiors and their subordinates are almost uncorrelated, at most one of them can reasonably be assumed to be correlated with "objective truth." We choose superiors" ratings for this role since their average rating is closer to the theoretical mean of 4.0. Though this seems the best available measure of overconfidence, we are aware that superiors will never be perfectly accurate in assessing their subordinates.
foreign exchange salespeople, one might guess that the pattern for women explains the pattern for salespeople, but the differences in overconfidentce between salespeople and others appear to be sustained after controlling for gender. We note in passing that the influence of gender on overconfidence remains uncertain: Deaves et al. (2003) , for example, find no influence.
It might also be natural to assume that miscalibration and hubris are closely related. Indeed, Gervais and Odean (2001) describe how hubris could be the source of miscalibration.
Nonetheless, the correlation coefficient between miscalibration and hubris is an economically small 0.15, though statistically significant. A weak relation between these two dimensions of overconfidence is consistent with results from other relevant studies (Deaves et al. (2003) ; Ré-gner et al. (2004) ; Glaser and Weber (2007) ).
Our analysis of the survival of overconfidence is organized around two testable implications of Friedman"s famous assertion that imperfect rationality is driven out of markets (1953) 
A. Absolute Rationality: Are The Most Experienced Dealers Overconfident?
If imperfect rationality is driven out of the market, the most experienced traders will not be overconfident at all. Table 7 , which reports the averages of our two overconfidence measures for dealers in different experience categories, provides no support for this hypothesis.
In Table 7A , which focuses on miscalibration, we find that overconfidence is statistically significant among the most experienced dealers no matter how we measure experience. Among dealers with fifteen or more years of trading experience, confidence intervals are about half as large as they should be if dealers were well-calibrated, with t-statistic of 9.9. Confidence intervals among dealers over 40 years old are 46 percent smaller than they should be, with t-statistic of 24.4, and among Head Traders/Treasurers they are over 60 percent too small, with t-statistic of 4.5.
Hubris is also strong, both economically and statistically, for experienced dealers. For dealers with fifteen or more years of experience, hubris averages 0.65, with t-statistic 2.2. This represents a substantial distortion of their performance ratings, as it covers over a quarter of the gap between the superior"s average performance rating for this group, which is 4.5, and the highest possible rating , which is seven. Average hubris is 0.46 for dealers over 40 years old, with tstatistic 2.1, which implies that this group inflates their performance rating almost 20 percent of the way towards ideal performance, on average. Average hubris is 1.13 for Head Traders and Treasurers, which implies these individuals inflated their performance rating almost half-way to ideal performance.
As discussed in Section III, the incentives to overcome miscalibration are strongest for proprietary traders, so this group provides a particularly strong test of whether experienced declines are overconfident. However, the miscalibration and hubris measures for this group provide no evidence for dealer rationality. Among the most experienced proprietary traders, both miscalibration and hubris are statistically and economically significant. (Note that, to conserve statistical power, we create fewer age categories when analyzing proprietary traders; we also do not use "rank" to measure experience since almost all proprietary traders have the rank of Senior Trader or higher.)
We also examine miscalibration among dealers at top-tier banks (as noted earlier, our hubris measures already apply only to top-tier banks). These dealers likely have greater influence over market prices than other dealers because they have larger position limits and more customers. In effect, the marginal or price-setting agents in the foreign exchange market are more likely to work at large banks than small banks. A comparison of Table 7D , which focuses on top-tier banks, and Table 7A , which considers all traders, suggests no difference between dealer miscalibration at top-and lower-tier banks. Our conclusion that experienced dealers are positively overconfident is also sustained if we focus exclusively on the currencies that dealers trade most actively.
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13 Results of these robustness tests are available upon request.
B. Relative Rationality: Does Overconfidence Decline With Experience?
Even if overconfidence doesn"t completely disappear with experience it could still be modrated by experience. To examine whether this actually occurs compare overconfidence across dealers with varying experience. Table 7A shows that miscalibration varies little with experience. When experience is measured in terms of years spent trading, measured miscalibration is 0.46 for the group with least experience, 0.47 for the group with intermediate experience, and 0.50 for dealers who have been trading 15 years or longer. Even though the slight differences across these measures are not statistically significant, we note for later reference that the direction of change runs counter to the hypothesis that irrational traders are driven out of financial markets. When experience is measured by age, the miscalibration point estimates vary nonmonotonically with experience -they average 0.46 for the two youngest groups, 0.51 for traders in their late 30s, and then once again 0.46 for traders over forty -though these differences, too, are insignificant. When experience is measured by rank, miscalibration varies most widely, but even here it only ranges from 0.46 to 0.62. Here again, measured overconfidence is highest for the most experienced dealers though the differences across groups are insignificant.
As shown in Table 7B , the hubris measures provide even less support for the hypothesis that overconfidence declines with experience; indeed, this evidence suggests weakly that hubris rises with experience. This is not entirely surprising since, as discussed in Section I, there exists substantial evidence for the hypothesis that overconfidence gets stronger with experience, a result that is especially strong when correct answers are not much more likely than by chance, as in the foreign exchange market. When experience is measured by years spent trading, average hubris is 0.50 for the least experienced traders, 0.47 for traders with intermediate experience, and 0.65 for traders with the most experience. Though this suggests that hubris rises with experience, the differences across groups are again insignificant. When experience is measured by age or rank, however, the evidence that hubris rises with experience is a bit stronger. For both these measures of experience, average hubris is statistically insignificant, and lowest, for the least experienced traders while it is significant for all other groups. When experience is measured by age, average hubris is only 0.23 for those in their twenties but it ranges from 0.46 to 0.64 for older traders. When experience is measured by rank, average hubris is 0.41 for Trainees and Junior Traders, 0.45 for Senior Traders, and 1.13 for Head Traders/Treasurers. The evidence for the hypothesis that hubris rises with experience is weakened, however, by the fact that differences across hubris across experience categories remain insignificant.
The strongest evidence that experience and incentives fail to moderate overconfidence comes from a comparison of proprietary traders, as a group, with salespeople and interbank traders. As shown in the top panel of Table 7C , proprietary traders are significantly more miscalibrated and hubristic than salespeople, though salespeople forecast less frequently and are rewarded only indirectly for accuracy. Among proprietary traders with different levels of experience, miscalibration and hubris averages do not vary widely across experience categories and differences between experience categories are insignificant. The conclusion that overconfidence is not moderated by experience likewise gains no support from an analysis of dealers at top-tier banks.
C. Additional Tests
Since the results in Table 7 could conceivably be driven by a few extremely overconfident individuals, we present two additional sets of figures. These indicate that miscalibration and hubris are widespread. These tests, like our previous tests, provide no support for the hypothesis that imperfectly rationality is driven out of financial markets. Table 8A shows the share of dealers whose confidence intervals are too narrow, with the "correct" width again taken to be the width associated with the conditional volatility estimates.
Even for the most experienced dealers, the vast majority of confidence intervals are too narrow.
Further, the share of intervals that are too narrow is, in essence, insensitive to the dealers" level of experience. This conclusion holds for all three approaches to measuring of experience and, though not shown in the table, it also holds if we focus exclusively on the currencies that dealers most actively trade. Table 8B shows the fraction of dealers rating themselves above and below average, along with the fraction of dealers rated above and below average by their superiors, disaggregated according to experience as measured by years of trading experience, age, or rank. The fraction of experienced dealers rating themselves above average ranges from 67 percent to 81 percent and is substantially above the corresponding fraction from their superiors in almost every case. For example, 73 percent of dealers with over twenty years of experience rated themselves above average. This might seem potentially reasonable, since these dealers have clearly thrived in this market, but according to their superiors only half of these dealers were actually above average. Thus the tendency to overrate one"s-self appears to characterize even the most seasoned currency dealers. Further, the table provides no evidence that this tendency abates as dealers gain experience.
The results of this section suggest consistently that imperfect rationality is not driven out of currency markets. Despite many years of trading and strong incentives to accuracy, experienced dealers still tend to overestimate the precision of their information and still tend to overestimate their own abilities. Further, these tendencies do not appear decline as dealers gain experience.
VI. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
This paper tests whether overconfident traders are driven out of the foreign exchange market. Friedman famously claimed that imperfectly rational traders will be driven out of the market by trading losses (1953), a claim that has been influential because it suggests that imperfect rationality can be disregarded and we can reasonably assume efficient markets. Nonetheless, the claim has rarely, if ever, been tested. We focus on a well-documented form of imperfect rationality, overconfidence, and test its survival among the traders who set prices in the world"s largest market.
We set the stage for our analysis by providing evidence that currency dealers, like most people, display two types of overconfidence: they tend to overestimate the precision of their information (miscalibration) and they tend to overestimate their professional success (hubris). We then compare the overconfidence of foreign exchange dealers with various degrees of experience. The results indicate that even the most experienced dealers are strongly overconfident and that overconfidence is not moderated by experience or incentives.
These conclusions hold for both types of overconfidence; they hold regardless of whether we measure experience by years spent trading, age, or professional rank; they hold for proprietary traders, the ones with the strongest incentives to accuracy, as well as other traders; and they hold for the subset of our dealers who work at the most active dealing banks. The survival of overconfidence among influential financial-market participants with strong incentives to accuracy is not consistent with the assumptions of perfect rationality and efficient markets. Nonetheless, our results are consistent with much evidence from economics and psychology.
Future research could constructively examine the mechanism(s) through which dealer overconfidence survives. Among the many possibilities worth exploring, we highlight three:
Overconfidence, by leading others to have inflated opinions of one"s success, might increase one"s likelihood of promotion within an organization; overconfidence, by enhancing cognitive facility, might enhance dealers" ability to identify profitable trading opportunities; overconfidence, by fostering persistence and a tolerance for adversity, might enable dealers to sustain a career with such intense competition and frequent setbacks.
Juslin, P. The overconfidence phenomenon as a consequence of informal experimenter-guided selection of almanac items. Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes, 57 (1994) : 226-246. Directory (Nicolson 2002) . Foreign exchange traders at these institutions were sent questionnaires by mail. Of 529 questionnaires sent to banks in this group, 90 were returned, resulting in a questionnaire return rate of 17% for this group.
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14. The participation rate among lower tier banks is below that of the top tier banks, but still higher than the 8 percent reported from a previous survey in the U.S. foreign exchange market (Cheung and Chinn, 2001 ) which used a comparable mail-out procedure. Panels B and C compare the proportionate width of the confidence intervals to an objective econometric estimate of the proper width, specifically the ninety-percent confidence interval constructed from GARCH volatility estimates ending in the month each forecast was compiled. Exchange-rate data from Datastream. Under the null hypothesis of rationality and independence, the true fraction is 50 percent, so statistical significance is calculated using the binomial distribution with p = 0.5. Significance at the ten percent level indicated by *. Significance at the five percent level indicated by **. In Panel B, statistical significance is below 0.0001 in each case. The table shows that North American currency market professionals tend to rate themselves as "better than average." Self-assessments of personal success were submitted by 401 individuals as part of a survey distributed in June of 2002. Participants were asked to rate their own professional success on a scale of 1 = far below average to 7 = far above average, with 4 = average. "Top Tier" traders worked for "Top Tier" banks, meaning banks singled out for excellent by various market sources (see Appendix 1 for further details). The table shows that the tendency of North American currency market professionals to rate themselves as "better than average" is statistically significantly different from perfect rationality. Self-assessments of personal success were submitted by 416 North American currency market professionals as part of a survey distributed in June of 2002. Survey participants were asked to rate their own professional success on a scale of 1 = far below average to 7 = far above average, with 4 = average. Their superiors were asked to rate them on the same scale, with respect to three dimensions of success: Trading Profits, Trading Potential, and Overall Contribution. This table presents results of a bootstrap test of the hypothesis that the participants are overconfident, on average, as suggested by the high share of participants rating themselves above average and the small share rating themselves below average. The null hypothesis is that the participants are not overconfident. The statistical significance of the observed shares was found by calculating the distribution of shares that would have been observed for 1,000 sets of n traders had the true distribution of success ratings been represented by the ratings submitted by superiors, where n is the number of individuals with a self-rating and a complete set of ratings by their superior within a given rank-responsibility combination. This should represent the distribution of these shares under the null, for that group. The table shows the observed share and its marginal significance. Values of 0.000 indicate that the most extreme simulated share was less extreme than the observed share. Miscalibration is the average proportionate gap between the width of a trader"s confidence intervals and the horizon-appropriate widths based on GARCH estimates of conditional volatility. For perfectly calibrated individuals, "miscalibration" equals zero. Hubris measures are based on assessments of the dealers" personal success submitted. Survey participants were asked to rate their own professional success on a scale of 1 = far below average to 7 = far above average, with 4 = average. Their superiors were asked to rate them on the same scale. The hubris measure itself is the difference between the superior"s rating and the individual"s own rating. "Hubris share" represents measured hubris as a fraction of the gap between seven, the highest possible rating, and the superior"s average rating for a given group. Table shows the share of dealers' confidence intervals that are narrower than the correct width calculated from GARCH volatility estimates. Under the null hypothesis of perfect rationality one half of the confidence intervals would be narrower than the objective benchmark. Marginal significance for each of the ten currency-forecast-date pairs is evaluated using the binomial distribution with n = the number of forecasts for that pair and p = 0.5. The "Maximum marginal significance" is taken over those ten pairs; the "Number significant at 1%" the number of those ten pairs significant at the 1 percent level.
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